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Summary 
The EU has consistently stressed the primacy of 
democracy  assistance  in  its  pronouncements  on 
EU external policy, but its actions have noticeably 
lagged behind. At the heart of the problem are the 
absence  of  available  appropriate  instruments, 
incoherent  external  action  and  convoluted 
decision-making  procedures  that  require  the 
mobilisation  of  unanimity  and  the  political 
backing  of  all  27  EU  member  states.  The  Arab 
Spring once again highlighted the EU’s inability 
to  react  swiftly  and  decisively  to  the 
extraordinary  events  unfolding  in  its 
neighbourhood.  
The  realisation  that  the  EU  needs  a  less 
‘traditional’  and  more  rapid  and  flexible 
instrument  for  democracy  assistance  prompted 
reflections on the new European Endowment for 
Democracy  (EED).  Poland  jump-started  the 
process  by  presenting  the  initial  draft  proposal 
about  a  year  ago.  The  final  result  of  stormy 
political discussions in the meantime is soon to be 
presented  in  the  form  of  a  statute  officially 
establishing the EED.  
In  examining  the  process  of  the  EED’s 
establishment,  this  Policy  Brief  arrives  at  three 
main  conclusions.  First,  the  initial  ambitious 
proposals of the EED were diluted in the attempt 
to have all the EU member states on board. This 
resulted  in  the  attenuation  of  a  number  of 
intended  innovative  aspects  caused  by  lengthy 
political bargaining between the EU governments 
with  divergent  interests.  Despite  such  an 
inclusive membership however, the EED did not 
secure all member states’ political backing.   
Secondly,  having  all  EU  member  states 
represented  in  the  Board  of  Governors  did  not 
automatically  translate  into  tangible  financial 
support for the EED. Thus far, a minority of the 
member states have made informal promises to 
provide  funds,  and  the  European  Commission 
has pledged to match the amount collected. 
Thirdly,  despite  these  setbacks,  the  ongoing 
discussions  over  a  more  detailed  operating 
framework  of  the  EED  however  offer  another 
opportunity  to  empower  the  new  ‘instrument’ 
with  intended  added  value.  To  this  end,  we 
provide four recommendations for specific areas 
that  are  expected  to  be  of  key  importance  in 
making the EED a real game changer in the EU’s 
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Who pulls the strings?  
According to the draft version of the statute, the 
EED will operate as a private foundation under 
Belgian law, which better serves the purposes of 
the instrument than the international convention 
originally  proposed  by  Poland.  The  legal 
foundation of an international convention would 
require ratification of an international agreement, 
with varying procedures in each of the member 
states,  which  could  have  further  delayed  the 
setting up of the EED. The decision to base the 
EED  headquarters  in  Brussels  facilitates 
cooperation  with  the  rest  of  the  Brussels-based 
institutions and member states representations.  
The  EED  will  operate  under  the  strategic 
guidance and oversight of a Board of Governors 
while  a  more  streamlined  decision-making 
process  will  take  place  in  the  Executive 
Committee. The administrative functions will be 
handled  by  the  Secretariat  which  is  to  be  as 
compact as possible to keep the operating costs to 
a minimum. 
The  Board  of  Governors  is  to  consist  of  one 
representative from the Foreign Offices for each 
member  state  (plus  Croatia),  with  each  having 
one  vote  regardless  of  their  financial  support.1 
With no specific details on the selection criteria 
for representatives, departments working on aid, 
development and democratisation are expected to 
be given priority. The European External Action 
Service (EEAS) is to be represented by an official 
from  the  office  of  the  High  Representative  for 
Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy  (HRVP). 
There is no specification as to who will represent 
the European Commission. The representative of 
the  Directorate-General  for  Development  and 
Cooperation-EuropeAid  (DG  DEVCO)  will 
therefore  be  the  most  desirable  choice  in 
particular for providing specific contributions on 
the financial side and in assessing the feasibility 
of projects. 
The European Parliament is offered nine seats on 
the Board. This is important in view of securing 
political  backing  for  the  EED.  There  is  also  the 
question of which Members of the EP will become 
                                                   
1 The voting rules were the subject of the fiercest debate 
dragging  on  from  September  2011,  with  some  of  the 
member states arguing that tying the voting rights to the 
level  of  financial  contribution  would  be  the  main 
incentive for member states to provide funding.  
Board members. Some MEPs predominantly from 
the  EP’s  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  (AFET) 
have  already  contributed  to  the  composition  of 
the EED.2 The EP can bring added value to the 
project  if  its  representation  is  chosen  on  the 
grounds  of  expertise  and  experience  and  if  the 
idea of non-partisan contribution is maintained.   
The  decision  to  include  representation  of  civil 
society,  advocated  by  the  EEAS,  aims  to 
strengthen the expertise capacity, but also brings 
neutrality to the external perception of the EED. 
However, the notion, as discussed, of including 
merely three representatives indicates a potential 
danger  of  minimising  their  importance  vis-à-vis 
other members of the Board. The representation 
of  civil  society  and  the  EU  institutions  could 
become  particularly  important  in  ensuring  that 
the EED is perceived as neutral and distant from 
the  individual  national  interests  of  the  member 
states. It will also be important in case a member 
state  would  like  to  distance  itself  vis-à-vis  a 
particular  government  of  the  targeted  third 
country. 
Keeping  the  Board  of  Governors  at  the  highest 
political level is a must in order to mobilise and 
maintain political will and support for the EED. 
Nevertheless,  the  current  composition  of  the 
Board  makes  the  EED  a  ‘very’  political  animal 
that  might  create  a  situation  where  political 
discussions  are  dominated  by  nationally  and 
institutionally  driven  interests,  consequently 
making  it  extremely  difficult  to  reach  an 
agreement.  
The Executive Committee, which will be drawn 
from  the  Board  of  Governors,  should  grant  a 
large amount of discretion to counterbalance the 
over-politicisation  of  the  Board  of  Governors. 
This  would  permit  the  Executive  Committee  to 
distance  itself  from  the  particular  national  and 
institutional  interests  and  instructions.  It  would 
therefore  avoid  constant  and  time-consuming 
politicking typical of the EU and emerge as the 
body  that  will  provide  the  EED  with  a  flexible 
and  rapid  decision-making.  The  Committee 
should be authorised to make decisions based on 
the  feasibility  of  the  proposed  support  and  the 
                                                   
2 See “Report with a proposal for a European Parliament 
recommendation to the Council on the modalities for the 
possible  establishment  of  a  European  Endowment  for 
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impact it could have on strengthening democracy 
in the country in question, independently of the 
priorities of a member government.  
The  Executive  Committee  is  to  consist  of  seven 
members, headed by an Executive Director, from 
which one seat is reserved for the EP, two seats 
for  the  member  states  and  the  remaining  three 
will be decided by the Board of Governors. These 
three seats should be allocated to the members of 
civil society balancing its underrepresentation in 
the Board of Governors as well as for the purpose 
of securing the neutrality of the decisions taken. 
All  Committee  members should  have particular 
expertise in democracy support and assistance at 
the national or/and European level.  
Appointing the Executive Director will be another 
opportunity  to  strengthen  the  capacities  of  the 
EED. It would be commendable to select a person 
who  already  has  relevant  European  experience 
and  thus  the  understanding  of  the  EU’s  formal 
and  informal  political  and  inter-institutional 
dynamics. He or she should also be chosen based 
on  a  strong  personality  and  a  reputation  for 
toughness in order to enable the EED to be pro-
active and assertive. 
On the one hand, the choice of setting up the EED 
under  Belgian  law  might  suggest  that  those 
involved  in  the  process  favoured  granting  the 
Executive Committee substantial independence in 
its  decision-making,  which  usually  is  the  case 
with  Belgian  NGOs.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
criteria  for  representation  in  the  Executive 
Committee  are  vague  and  the  process  of  filling 
the  positions  might  turn  into  another  cycle  of 
political  bargaining  between  the  EU  member 
states  and  institutions,  thus  potentially  limiting 
the discretion of the Executive Committee.  
Budget  
The  fact  that  thus  far  the  EED  failed  to  secure 
official  contributions  from  the  majority  of 
member states could be the biggest hindrance of 
the instrument. To date, only Poland and Sweden 
have  informally  pledged  contributions  of  €5 
million each, and the Commission is expected to 
match that amount with funds transferred from 
the  European  Neighbourhood  and  Partnership 
Instrument  (ENPI).  This  sum  is  nowhere  large 
enough to permit the EED to perform its expected 
role. There is a need for substantial contributions 
by  the  member  states  on  an  ongoing  basis  to 
make sure that the EED can operate properly.  
Moreover, the budget will be split into two parts: 
funds  originating  from  the  Commission  and 
funds  from  the  EU  member  states.  The 
Commission’s  money  will  be  allocated  under 
strict EU regulations, which ‘by definition’ limits 
the  flexibility  of  the  EED.  These  follows 
complicated process including but not limited to 
multi-annual  programming,  a  lengthy  and 
complex  application  process,  registration  in  the 
Potential  Applicant  Data  Online  Registration 
(PADOR), reporting requirements, accountability 
rules, limitations for re-granting and the need to 
secure co-financing on the part of applicants.  
The contributions coming from the individual EU 
member  states  will  be  managed  under separate 
rules in line with the rules of the accountability 
and  transparency  of  the  contributing  member 
state. Most of the funding coming from member 
states, however, is more flexible and also fungible 
and thus can be mixed with other funding, while 
making it subject to ‘common’ rules established 
by  the  EED.  These  regulations  should  be  fast, 
flexible  and  non-bureaucratic,  with  no 
requirement of co-funding from the beneficiaries.  
The  most  obvious  approach  in  managing  these 
two  budget  lines  would  be  to  use  the  funds 
originating from the Commission for operational 
costs  of  the  EED  and  for  the  ‘traditional’ 
democracy  assistance  activities.  The  money 
allocated by the EU member states could be used 
for  the  truly  high-risk  and  innovative  projects 
that require rapid and flexible interventions.  
Mobilising additional funding 
The EED will need to mobilise funding beyond 
the member states’ and the Commission’s direct 
contributions. The money transfer from the ENPI 
to  the  EED’s  budget  is  a  one-time  undertaking, 
providing  the  project  with  start-up  capital. 
Removing the link between the voting weight of 
the  member  state  representatives  and  funding 
contributions severely limits the incentive for the 
member  states  to  fund  the  EED.  The  peer-
pressure effect can act as additional motivation, 
particularly  for  countries  that  already  enjoy  a 
strong  reputation  in  democracy  assistance.  This 
will  only  be  the  case,  however,  if  the  EED  is 4 | KOSTANYAN & NASIENIAK 
 
perceived  as  capable  of  acting  where  other 
instruments cannot.  
The  EED  might  need  to  develop  a  funding 
strategy  by  identifying  various  possible  sources 
for  securing  additional  money.  Fundraising 
should  be  taken  into  account  as  one  of  the 
possible manners of gathering additional support. 
As  illustrated  by  the  example  of  donor 
conferences organised by the EU and/or member 
states, such as the recent ones for Belarus initiated 
by  Poland,  for  Moldova  led  by  the  EU  and  for 
Georgia organised jointly by the Commission and 
World  Bank.  Such  events  can  be  successful  in 
mobilising ad-hoc funds, especially for countries 
that  are  high  on  the  political  agenda  for  either 
good or bad reasons at the given time. 
Promotion  of  joint  projects  with  other 
organisations,  such  as  the  US  National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED), the UN and 
the  Council  of  Europe,  could  increase  available 
sources of funding. The EED should promote the 
pooling  of  resources  through  so-called  ‘basket 
funding’.  To avoid  stirring  up  controversy  over 
the nature of particular organisations, the choice 
should  be  made  carefully  each  time.  The  EED 
should  be  able  to  identify  preferable  partner 
organisations in advance in order to speed up the 
process and streamline the cooperation. Once the 
EED proves its value by developing a strong and 
uncontroversial  brand,  it  will  become  easier  to 
mobilise additional funding. 
Funding criteria 
Setting clear yet flexible criteria for funding will 
be a challenging task. On the one hand, detailed 
criteria could limit the possibility of the decision-
making  becoming  a  subject  of  nationally  or 
institutionally-driven  policy  agendas.  Working 
rules can be established to minimise in particular 
ongoing  debates  between  the  member  states  on 
prioritising  the  Eastern  vs.  the  Southern 
Neighbourhood as well as the institutional ‘turf 
battles’ between the EEAS, the Commission and 
the  EP.  On  the  other  hand,  setting  the  funding 
criteria  too  narrowly  could  undermine  the 
flexibility  of  the  EED.  Therefore,  establishing  a 
general  framework  for  funding  criteria  could 
result  in  agreeing  on  a  minimum  common 
denominator without undermining the flexibility 
of the instrument. 
The identification of the beneficiaries in the draft 
version  of  the  statute  has  been  kept  rather 
general, with the EED supporting pro-democratic 
movements and activists. This indicates a flexible 
approach  towards  identifying  potential  grant 
recipients  that  could  trigger  and  lead  the 
democratic transition. The flexibility of the EED is 
also  maintained  in  the  fact  that  it  will  allocate 
funding without prior consent of local authorities 
and governments. 
Transparency and accountability  
The highly sensitive circumstances in which the 
EED will operate will pose a particular challenge 
to  ensure  a  correct  balance  between  achieving 
transparency  and  accountability  while  not 
compromising  the  confidentiality  and  safety  of 
supported individuals and organisations.  
On  the  one  hand,  the  proposed  two-stage 
assessment system with reports being produced 
by the both Executive Director and the externally 
delegated  audit  will  ensure  sufficient 
transparency  and  accountability  of  the  EED. 
These  will  assess  the  effectiveness  of  the 
programme  in  light  of  the  motives  behind  the 
decisions taken.  On the other hand, the EED will 
need to be prepared to deviate from its ‘regular’ 
accountability  rules  in  some  cases  in  order  to 
provide  discrete  support  where  it  is  necessary. 
This creates additional incentive of committing to 
the accountability standards internally among the 
member  states,  institutions  and  civil  society 
groups involved in EED’s decision making, rather 
than being imposed externally.  
Creating synergies 
Ensuring  a  cooperative  relationship  between 
actors working in the field of democracy support 
is a must in order to make sure that the creation 
of  the  EED  does  not  stimulate  further  wasteful 
competition over already limited funding in this 
area.  Particularly  in  the  current  climate  of 
financial austerity, the presence of various actors 
taking  part  in  democracy  assistance  should  be 
seen  as  an  asset,  not  as  a  rivalry  for  the  same 
source of funding. Therefore, it is necessary to set 
up general guidelines for developing cooperation 
between  the  EED  and  other  actors  operating  in 
this field so the joint effort multiplies individual 
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In  addition,  emphasis  should  be  placed  on  a 
possibility  of  promoting  regional  projects.  As 
seen in the case of the Arab Spring, other regions 
too can undergo similar transitions. The EED can 
advocate closer cooperation between countries by 
supporting  exchange  of  experience  and  good 
practices.  Moreover,  through  facilitating  a  peer-
pressure  where  possible,  the  EED  could  aim  to 
reinforce  commitments  of  targeted  countries  to 
democratic values. 
Building up the expertise capacity 
There  is  no  one  model  of  democracy  and  thus 
there is no single policy of democracy assistance. 
Moreover, with the composition of the Executive 
Committee changing on a regular basis, there is a 
need to institutionalise the internal development 
of knowledge and expertise into a set of working 
procedures  and  an  internal  handbook  on  the 
implementation  to  streamline  the  decision-
making process. This is expected to be largely a 
process of ‘learning by doing’. 
Since  the  EED  will  not  operate  through  the 
network of local offices, at least in the early stages 
of  its  existence,  and  with  no  representation  in 
targeted countries, the Secretariat General should 
become  a  centre  for  coordinating  information 
management  from  various  sources.  Those 
recruited  to  work  in  the  EED  should  not  be 
generalists but rather specialists on the targeted 
regions and countries.  
Furthermore, the EED will need to make use of 
existing expertise in the EP, the Commission, the 
EEAS and EU Delegations as well as in the EU 
member  state  capitals  and  diplomatic 
representations. 
Promoted particularly by the EEAS and the EP, 
civil  society  groups  have  already  managed  to 
leave  their  footprint  on  the  EED’s  modalities 
during numerous conferences, consultations and 
interventions  in  the  EP’s  Committee  of  Foreign 
Affairs (AFET). The expertise of these groups in 
managing  democracy  assistance,  which  is 
generally  perceived  as  efficient  and  effective, 
should be further sought by the EED.   
Developing inclusive political stage  
On the one hand, the EED’s funding will be used 
in high-risk environments. It will be tempting to 
select and target countries already in the spotlight 
and/or those showing more promise as the EU’s 
assistance  would  be  more  visible.  On  the  other 
hand, support for the countries not experiencing 
major  shake-ups  might  prove  to  be  less 
spectacular  but  equally  necessary  to  ensure  the 
ability  of  the  democratic  groups  to  trigger  a 
change  in  the  future.  Consequently,  the  EED 
should  be  employed  in  both  pre-transition  and 
transition stages and maintained until other EU 
instruments  are  activated  in  order  to  provide 
sustainable support.  
The  EED  must  moreover  provide  funding  for 
governments,  local  authorities  and  parliaments 
willing  to  reform  and  embark  on  democratic 
transformation.  Consequently,  the  EED  should 
welcome all possible stakeholders in the targeted 
country  and  equip  them  to  take  part  in  the 
political process and democratic transformation. 
Only the broadest possible political dialogue can 
produce  sustainable  democracy.  This  might  be 
particularly difficult in the regions and countries 
where  the  transition  is  followed  by  conflicts. In 
such cases, the EED’s activities would have to be 
accompanied by extensive reconciliation process.  
It  will  be  important  to  find  a  compromise 
between supporting big and thus usually better 
organised  groups  with  a  proven  record  and 
grassroots  organisations  often  perceived  as 
marginal  and  ineffective.  In  order  to  engage 
underdeveloped  organisations,  there  should  be 
no  requirements  for  co-financing  and  the 
application  process  should  be  straightforward. 
The EED’s support should aim at strengthening 
the capacity of these organisations. The renewal 
of-grants  without  restrictions  imposed  on  the 
number  of  times  renewal  can  be  requested  is 
usually  the  most  flexible  form  of  funding  and 
thus the EED should include this option.  
The  EED  should  support  actors  who  are 
underrepresented on the local political stage and 
have  limited  administrative  or  other  capacities. 
Such actors are not able to play a meaningful role 
on their own and are also not capable of applying 
for  EU  funding  due  to  a  lack  of  human  and 
financial  resources.  Depending  on  the  local 
context, such vulnerable groups are often women, 
youth and minorities, but also opposition parties. 
The EED should be cautious not to follow the lists 
of ‘usual suspects’, which is often the case with 
the EU Delegations, instead aiming for inclusion 
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Supporting local ownership 
For  decades,  a  major  criticism  of  the  EU’s 
engagement  in  the  neighbourhood  has  been  its 
insufficient attention to the needs of the partner 
countries and pursuing its own agenda. This led 
to  the  situation  where  many  the  organisations, 
notably  in  the  countries  of  the  Eastern 
Partnership, have pursued the priorities specified 
by  the  EU  funding  programmes  but  not 
necessarily those corresponding to their needs in 
advancing democratic standards.  
The  EED  must  aim  to  facilitate  a  favourable 
environment for the local  communities to make 
decisions  on  their  own  terms.  Inadequate 
involvement  of  representatives  of  partner 
countries  at  the programming  level  of  the  EU’s 
financial  instruments  and  insufficient 
consideration paid to expertise of the local society 
have  often  led  to  the  situation  where  the  EU’s 
implementation  of  democracy  assistance  is 
detached  from  the  local  context.  It  is  therefore 
crucial  for  the  EED  to  involve  democratic 
representatives  of  the  targeted  countries  in  the 
discussions at the earliest possible stage to ensure 
that  the  design  of  the  support  is  the  most 
appropriate.  Such  demand-driven  support 
focusing on particular needs of the country could 
promote  local  involvement  and  thus  strengthen 
local ownership of the democratisation process. 
Since the EED will operate globally, it will have to 
deal  with  diverse  communities  with  different 
political,  cultural  and  religious  sensitivities 
requiring adoption of an individual approach in 
each case. Such country-specific strategies should 
be based on an impact assessment with reference 
to  the  decision  whether  or  not  to  grant  the 
support,  but  also  to  the nature  of  the provided 
support.  The  need  for  an  informed  decision, 
based  on  diversely  gathered  information  and 
impact assessment analyses, in combination with 
the urgency for immediate action would have to 
be incorporated into developing a smart and fast 
track approach. 
Ensuring coherent action 
The  addition  of  a  new  instrument  to  the  EU’s 
existing  diverse  portfolio  for  democracy 
promotion increases the need for vertical, inter-
institutional,  horizontal  and  external  coherence. 
Avoiding  duplication  across  various  levels 
becomes even more challenging. The need for a 
comprehensive  framework  for  EU  democracy 
promotion becomes even more pressing. Such an 
overarching  strategy  will  strengthen  the 
efficiency  and  coordination  between  the  EU’s 
geographical and thematic programmes. 
By  acting  on  the  basis  of  a  fast  and  flexible 
approach, the EED’s support is often expected to 
be  ad  hoc  and  fragmented.  Therefore,  it  is 
necessary  to  integrate  it  into  a  wider  strategy 
linked to the other instruments in general and the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights  (EIDHR)  in  particular  with  the  aim  of 
creating  a  coherent  action  framework  for 
subsequent stages of democratic transformation. 
Specifically, the EED could become an instrument 
for funding projects that would not qualify under 
other  EU  instruments.  Instruments  and 
programmes such as the EIDHR,3 the Instrument 
of Stability, the Civil Society Facility and the Non-
State  Actors  and  Local  Authorities  programme 
should be scrutinised to identify the gaps.  
The  principle  of  complementarity  should  be 
upheld  in  all  aspects  of  the  EED’s  operations.4 
Close  cooperation  between  the  EED,  the  EEAS, 
the Commission and the member states is the key 
to  ensuring  a  coherent  and  sustainable 
framework of support. The role of the EEAS and 
the  Commission  will  be  crucial  in  order  to 
provide  the  EED’s  decision-makers  with 
knowledge  on  how  the  other  EU  instruments 
work and thus plan how the support should be 
continued at the later stage.  
EU  delegations  in  the  targeted  countries  could 
serve as a primary source of information on the 
situation  on  the  ground  and  advice  on  what 
works  best  in  a  particular  context.  Their  input 
should be used by the EEAS and DG DEVCO for 
drafting short and medium-term impact analyses 
that should serve as a basis for making decisions 
and granting support. Subsequently they should 
be incorporated in the comprehensive and longer-
term action plans producing a coherent response 
                                                   
3  The  EIDHR,  for  example,  has  been  criticised  for  not 
giving enough support to non-registered beneficiaries.  
4 Nevertheless, the EED is not responsible for providing 
the complementarity of the strategies. This is a task for 
the HRVP, the EEAS and the Commission, but the EED 
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towards  developing  sustainable  democracy  in  a 
given country.  
Finally, the cooperation with other international 
and  multilateral  organisations,  as  well  as 
individual member states present on the ground 
will  help  avoid  duplication  of  effort.  EU 
Delegations should be also helpful in identifying 
other  potential  sources  of  funding  and  partner 
organisations  interested  in  teaming  up  for  joint 
projects. The key challenge would be to design an 
information-sharing  procedure  which  would 
enable for fast exchanges between all actors and 
to ensure confidentiality of often highly sensitive 
information.  
Making a difference 
EU’s  democracy  assistance,  as  seen  particularly 
on the example of the southern neighbourhood, 
has an ambiguous tradition of democracy efforts 
often  being  a  hostage  to  political  and  security 
concerns  or/and  economic  opportunities. 
Therefore,  with  the  paradigm  shift  in  the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) towards 
the “more for more” concept, requiring evidence 
of  achievement  as  a  precondition  for  receiving 
more funding, the EU can no longer avoid firmly 
stating  the  primacy  of  supporting  democratic 
aspirations  in  third  countries.  The  European 
Consensus  on  Democracy  should  be  finally 
agreed on, adopted and implemented. The ENP 
concept  of  ‘deep  and  sustainable  democracy’, 
contained in the declaration on the establishment 
of  the  EED,5  can  be  used  as  a  starting  point 
towards elaborating what kind of democracy the 
EU wants to promote. This would subsequently 
allow  for  identifying  possible  dimensions  of 
democracy  assistance  and  concrete  actions  that 
should be supported. 
The  existence  of  active  political  parties  is  a 
defining  measure  for  an  inclusive  political 
environment.  The  direct  funding  for  political 
parties by the EED is expected to meet resistance 
by a number of member states. This is one of the 
areas where the EED’s initial value could be lost 
in due course of political bargaining. The example 
of the EIDHR support given for political parties 
via political foundations has proved to work well 
                                                   
5  See  ”Declaration  on  Establishing  the  European 
Endowment  for  Democracy,  18764/11,  Council  of  the 
European Union”, 20 December 2011.  
and without creating contentious implications for 
EU’s support. Therefore, one of the options could 
be  to  use  political  foundations  as  a  point  of 
indirect  transfer  of  funding.  However,  with 
growing operational confidence, the EED should 
be allowed to directly support the political parties 
based  on  the  principle  of  non-partisan 
engagement  on  an  ad-hoc  basis.  This  would 
require  guidelines  and  good  practices  on  what 
works  best  in  particular  situations.  Thus,  by 
building on the experience of other organisations, 
the NED and political foundations in particular, 
the  EED  should  be  able  to  judge  whether  it  is 
more  effective  and  appropriate  to  provide 
indirect  or  direct  funding,  depending  on  the 
circumstances. 
The  EED  should  not  become  a  substitute  for  a 
firmer and more political support of the EU in its 
democracy  assistance  in  and  of  itself.  Its 
implementation of practical measures should be 
accompanied  by  activities  of  the  relevant 
European institutions as well as member states, of 
course,  where  this  is  possible  and  does  not 
compromise the need to ensure discrete or/and 
neutral engagement.  
The EED should gradually stretch geographically 
in  terms  of  support  and  membership  including 
but not limited to countries of the EFTA and the 
candidate  countries. In  the short  term,  the  EED 
could  contribute  to  the  development  of  the  EU 
delegations by helping them to become local hubs 
of democracy assistance for other organisations. 
In the medium term, the EED could develop its 
own regional offices. 
Ultimately, the EED could contribute to a vastly 
improved implementation of the EU’s democracy 
assistance, which has particularly been seen as its 
weakest  link.  Adoption  of  a  more  flexible  and 
‘fast-track’  path  of  assessing  needs  and 
immediate  granting  of  money  could  deliver 
almost  immediate  tangible  results.  The  EED 
needs therefore to become an instrument free of 
nationally-driven decisions, European ‘turf wars’ 
and  cumbersome  bureaucracy.  The  Endowment 
can and should take on the challenge of making 
the EU a truly committed, pro-active and effective 
leader of democracy assistance.  
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Recommendations 
1. The EED will need a strong political backing in 
particular from the EU member states. However, 
the  ‘checks  and  balances’  within  the  decision-
making process of the EED should be insured. To 
this  end,  striking  the  right  balance  between  the 
roles of the Board of Governors and the Executive 
Committee  as  well  as  strong  presence  of  civil 
society  to  transcend  member  states’  narrow 
political concerns is of key importance. Inclusion 
of civil society will additionally enrich the EED 
with their practical experience.  
2.  The  decision-making  process  within  the  EED 
should be smart, fast and flexible for the use of 
the funds originating from the EU member states. 
The  EED  should  aim  for  a  budget  that  is 
comparable  to  that  of  the  US  National 
Endowment  for  Democracy  or  of  some  EU 
member states’ foundations in order to be capable 
of properly implementing its ambitious agenda. 
 
 
3. Leadership in democracy assistance requires a 
capacity  for  real  risk-taking,  which  the  EU  has 
lacked so far. As opposed to the ‘more for more’ 
principle, which has become the backbone of the 
ENP,  the  EED  should  follow  a  ‘more  for  less’ 
rationale  for  intervening  in  countries  where 
efforts  at  democratic  reform  are  still  deeply 
constrained.  This  new  approach  will  require 
‘learning by doing’ exercises while regular impact 
assessments should aim to minimise possibility of 
failure. Fear of failure, however, should no longer 
be  allowed  to  inhibit  the  EU’s  support  for 
democracy. 
4.  The  Board  of  Governors,  the  Executive 
Committee as well as the staff of the EED should 
be  composed  of  specialists  who  are  capable  of 
tabling  substantive  proposals  and  innovative 
methods.  Those  involved  in  the  EED  should 
refrain  from  turning  it  into  a  platform  for 
constant  politicking  and  the  defence  of  narrow 
national interests.  